SCOTUS: "Actual knowledge" means actual knowledge

The US Supreme Court can get behind being unanimous when faced with a statutory phrase that is written in "plain and unambiguous statutory language."

Intel Corp Committee v. Sulyma (US Supreme Ct 02/26/2020) [PDF] dealt with a statute of limitations that began to run when the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of an alleged breach. The Court held that “actual knowledge” means …. well …. actual knowledge.

ERISA §1113(2) requires plaintiffs with "actual knowledge" of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply.

Sulyma sued ERISA plan administrators alleging that they had managed the plans imprudently, and the administrators argued that Sulyma filed suit more than three years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him. Although Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these disclosures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly imprudent investments while working at Intel.

The 9th Circuit held that the administrators were not entitled to summary judgment because Sulyma's testimony created a dispute as to when he gained "actual knowledge" for purposes of §1113(2).

The US Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, and held that a plaintiff does not necessarily have "actual knowledge" under §1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet §1113(2)’s "actual knowledge" requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information. This is based on ERISA’s "plain and unambiguous statutory language." To have "actual knowledge" of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.