SCOTUS: Union access rule is a "taking"

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California has a regulation that grants labor organizations a "right to take access" to an agricultural employer’s property in order to solicit support for unionization.

The US Supreme Court holds (6-3) that this appropriates a right to invade the growers’ property and therefore constitutes a per se physical taking. Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid (US Supreme Ct 06/23/2021). [PDF]

That obligates the government to provide the owners with just compensation.

This is true even though the regulation does not allow for permanent and continuous access 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. A physical appropriation is a taking whether it is permanent or temporary. The duration of the appropriation bears only on the amount of compensation due.

The Court declined to adopt the theory that the access regulation merely regulates, and does not appropriate, the growers’ right to exclude.

Three Justices would hold that this was a "regulation" which requires the use of a complex balancing test to determine whether there has been a compensable taking.

SCOTUS will not be deciding a case on the N-Word in the workplace

I'm disappointed that the US Supreme Court decided NOT to decide a Title VII case involving the N-Word.

Collier v. Dallas County Hospital District [Briefs] [5th Circuit decision] seemed like the perfect case to grapple with the question of "Whether an employee’s exposure to the N-word in the workplace is severe enough to send his Title VII hostile-work-environment claim to a trier of fact."

The N-Word was scratched into an elevator that the employees used, and it stayed there for months.

And the District Court and the 5th Circuit held that this was not serious enough, and not pervasive enough, to alter the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment and create an abusive workplace.

The lower courts are split in terms of how they exactly handle the N-Word, but this case is just plain wrong. This is a case where a jury – not a judge – ought to be deciding whether there's an abusive workplace.

It's time to get the N-Word out of the workplace.

Football coach fired for praying

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It looks like the US Supreme Court is going to have a second shot at a case where a high school football coach got fired after he refused to stop his practice of saying a prayer right after the game on the 50 yard line surrounded by his players, surrounded by people from the stands. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (9th Cir 03/18/2021).

The first time this case went up to the Supreme Court, the lower courts had denied the coach an injunction against the school.

All the Supreme Court did was decide not to decide the case. Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (US Supreme Court cert denied 01/22/2019)

But four of the Justices indicated that they were quite critical of the way the 9th Circuit had analyzed this case. So we may see it go up again.

The case really involves a conflict between the coach’s free exercise of religion and the school district’s interest in not appearing to establish a religion by endorsing this particular practice. And the 9th Circuit held simply that the school district had a compelling interest in ensuring that they were not engaged in violating the 1st Amendment which prohibits the establishment of a religion.

Interesting case.

Next stop — Supreme Court.

N-Word at the US Supreme Court

[View the 1:15 minute video]

The N-Word has landed at the Supreme Court of the United States. Collier v. Dallas County Hospital District [Briefs]. Petition for a writ of certiorari filed on January 15, 2021.

The N-Word was scratched into an elevator that the employees used, and it stayed there for months.

And the lower courts are saying well, this is not serious enough, not pervasive enough to alter the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment and create an abusive workplace. [5th Circuit decision]

I know the lower courts are split in terms of how they exactly handle the N-Word, but this case is just plain wrong. And I want the Court to take this case up.

This is a case where the jury ought to be deciding whether there's an abusive workplace.

It's interesting that once the cert petition was filed the employer filed a waiver saying — well, we don't need to file a response to this case. And the court has asked the employer to file a response. (Due March 18, 2021)

So I'm hoping they take this case up.

It's time to get the N-Word out of the workplace.

Prediction in SCOTUS's "union trespass" case [Video]

Watch the video: https://youtu.be/0RoA__x92s0

I'm predicting that the US Supreme Court is going to overrule the 9th Circuit in a case involving union representatives getting access to private property. The case is Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid [Briefs].

The California Agricultural Labor Relations Board has a rule that says that agricultural growers in California are required to allow union representatives to come onto their property for as long as three hours a day and as many as 120 days a year. The three hours are an hour before work, an hour after work, and an hour during lunch.

The question in this case is whether this results in a "taking" under the 5th amendment, so that the government is required to compensate the growers for that taking. The cert petition phases the issue this way: "Whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment."

There's no question about whether this rule is valid. There's no question about whether it's a smart rule or an unwise rule. It's a question of whether this is a taking that requires compensation.

Both parties agree that what the government has done is taken easement.

What the Board is saying is Well, it's not all the time. It's not continuous. It's intermittent. It's only 120 days. It's only three hours a day And there are limitations on what these union reps can do while they are on the property.

And the growers are saying Well, yeah, but that doesn't really make any difference. If you take an easement, that is per se a “taking” under the 5th amendment, and the fact that it's intermittent and that there are restrictions on what the union reps can do — that goes to the amount of compensation. It doesn't go to the question of whether it's a taking in the first place.

And I'm predicting that the Supreme Court will come down on the side of the growers and say yes, this is a taking. The distinction between all-the-time and part-time really doesn't make any difference.

I say that not because I think the Supreme Court has some bias in favor of management or some ax to grind against unions. It's that this new Supreme Court has shown that it's willing to put much more vitality into the Bill of Rights. And this is a case where I think that's exactly what they're going to do.

The case will be argued probably later in the spring and we’ll get a decision by Summer.

Cert granted in "union trespass" case

The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid [Briefs] to review the 9th Circuit's decision. California law allows union organizers to go onto the land of agricultural growers for up to three hours per day and for up to 120 days per year. The activities are limited to meeting and talking with employees and soliciting their support; the number of organizers is limited; and business disruption is prohibited.

The issue in this case is whether California has to compensate the growers for a "taking" under the 5th amendment. This case is not about whether California's rule is lawful, or whether it is appropriate.

From a legal standpoint, this is a 5th amendment "takings" case. From a practical standpoint, this is a battle between agricultural employers and labor unions.

Here's how the cert petition phrased the Question Presented:

"California law forces agricultural businesses to allow labor organizers onto their property three times a day for 120 days each year. The regulation provides no mechanism for compensation. A divided panel below held that, although the regulation takes an uncompensated easement, it does not effect a per se physical taking of private property because it does not allow '24 hours a day, 365 days a year' occupation. As an eight-judge dissent from denial of rehearing en banc noted, the panel 'decision not only contradicts Supreme Court precedent but also causes a circuit split.'

"The question presented is whether the uncompensated appropriation of an easement that is limited in time effects a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment."

Here's how the California Agricultural Labor Board phrased the Question Presented:

"In 1975, the California Agricultural Labor Relations Board promulgated a regulation affording union organizers a limited right to access the property of agricultural employers. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20900(e). The Board modeled the regulation on a right of access that this Court has recognized under the National Labor Relations Act. See id. § 20900(b); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956). The state regulation restricts the right of access in several ways. Among other things, organizers may access only non-work spaces, during non-work periods, for no more than three hours per day, and for no more than four thirty-day periods each year. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 20900(e)(1)(A), (3). The only permissible purpose of the access is for organizers to meet and talk with employees and solicit their support, id. § 20900(e), and the access right terminates five days after the completion of a ballot count in a union representation election, id. § 20900(e)(1)(C). The organizers must provide advance notice to the employer, id. § 20900(e)(1)(B), and only two organizers, plus one additional organizer for every 15 employees beyond 30, may access the property, id. § 20900(e)(4)(A). Disruption of the employer’s business operations is prohibited. Id. § 20900(e)(4)(C).

"The question presented is: Whether the access regulation effects a per se physical taking of petitioners’ property under the Fifth Amendment."

Refund of fair share dues paid pre-Janus is denied. Next stop: Supreme Court.

It's quite rare for an appellant to ask a court to affirm the decision below. Yet that is what happened in Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union (7th Cir 12/09/2020).

Joseph Ocol is a math teacher in the Chicago public school system. After he was booted out of his union for failure to support a strike in 2016, he kept paying fair-share fees to the union. Those payments were required by the collective bargaining agreement, as authorized by a state statute.

Then the US Supreme Court decided Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), which held that forcing payment of fair share dues violates the constitution.

Ocol sued to get a refund of the dues he had paid prior to Janus, and mounted a First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation. The trial court held against him.

On appeal to the 7th Circuit, Ocol admitted that both claims are squarely foreclosed by precedent and requested that the 7th Circuit summarily affirm judgment in the defendants’ favor so that he may appeal to the Supreme Court.

The 7th Circuit was only too happy to comply. After all, every appellate court that has taken up the question has reached the same answer: A private party acting under color of state law for § 1983 purposes is entitled to a good-faith defense. And, in Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), the Supreme Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a similar exclusive representation provision applicable to state colleges in Minnesota.

Looks like Ocol will petition for certiorari. My bet is that cert will be denied, mainly because there is no split of authority among the lower courts.

7 US Supreme Court cases on employment law (2019-2020)

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During its 2019-2020 term, the US Supreme Court decided seven cases on employment law, including the game-changing decision that Title VII prohibits discrimination because an individual is gay or transgender.

Title VII, gay and transgender employees: An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII. Bostock v. Clayton County  (6-3).

Ministerial exception: The First Amendment’s Religion Clauses foreclose the adjudica­tion of employment-discrimination claims brought by fifth grade teachers at Catholic schools. Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru (7-2).

ACA Contraceptive mandate: Federal agencies had the authority under the ACA to promulgate religious and moral exemptions to the contraceptive mandate. Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (7-2).

Age discrimination: The ADEA demands that federal personnel actions be untainted by any consideration of age. To obtain reinstatement, dam­ages, or other relief related to the end result of an employment deci­sion, a showing that a personnel action would have been different if age had not been taken into account is necessary, but if age discrimi­nation played a lesser part in the decision, other remedies may be ap­propriate. Babb v. Wilkie (8-1).

Causation under 42 USC §1981: A §1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains con­stant over the life of the lawsuit. Comcast v. Natl Assoc of African American-Owned Media (9-0).

ERISA statute of limitations: A plaintiff does not necessarily have “actual knowledge” under §1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet §1113(2)’s “actual knowledge” requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information. Intel Corp Committee v. Sulyma (9-0)

ERISA standing: Plan beneficiaries whose benefits are defined lack standing to sue the plan for alleged poor investment of assets. Win or lose, they would still receive the exact same monthly benefits they are already entitled to receive. Thole v. U.S. Bank (5-4).

SCOTUS preview: Ministerial exception

[Video] I’m predicting a clear-cut victory for the schools in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru [Briefs].

Fifth grade teachers were fired, and claim violations of anti-discrimination laws. The schools argue that the 1st amendment “ministerial exception” allows them to decide who to hire and fire without any government interference.

The central issue is whether these teachers qualify as “ministers.”

Here’s hint at why I think the schools will win: I think there's already three Justices that are lined up in favor of the schools. Justice Alito and Kagan have made it very clear that all they care about is what this teacher is actually doing. They don't care about the titles or things like ordination and that sort of formal stuff. And Justice Thomas has said all he cares about is whether the school has a good faith belief that the teacher is helping to propagate the religion.

SCOTUS age discrimination decision - video

[Video] A US Supreme Court age discrimination case holds that for federal employees, "any" discrimination can establish liability. However "but-for" causation required for a tangible remedy. Babb v. Wilkie (US Supreme Court 04/06/2020) (8-1) [PDF].

This decision was a victory for the employee, yet it was a hollow victory indeed.

§1981 cases require but-for causation

[Video] Entertainment Studios Network (ESN), owned by an African-American, sued Comcast, a cable television conglomerate, claiming that Comcast's refusal to carry ESN's channels violated 42 USC §1981(a), which guarantees "[a]ll persons . . . the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens." At the pleading stage, the case turned on which causation standard to use. The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs had to point to facts plausibly showing that racial animus was a "but for" cause of the defendant’s conduct. The 9th Circuit reversed, holding that a plaintiff must only plead facts plausibly showing that race played "some role" in the defendant’s decisionmaking process.

The US Supreme Court unanimously held that a §1981 plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the plaintiff’s race was a but-for cause of its injury, and that burden remains constant over the life of the lawsuit. The Court said, "It is 'textbook tort law' that a plaintiff seeking redress for a defendant’s legal wrong typically must prove but-for causation," and there is no exception for §1981. Although Congress in 1991 adopted a "motivating factor" causation test for Title VII cases, §1981 dates back to 1866 and has never said a word about motivating factors.

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference postponed

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference has been postponed until September 16 & 17.  See announcement at https://pacificlaborlaw.com/

SCOTUS: "Actual knowledge" means actual knowledge

The US Supreme Court can get behind being unanimous when faced with a statutory phrase that is written in "plain and unambiguous statutory language."

Intel Corp Committee v. Sulyma (US Supreme Ct 02/26/2020) [PDF] dealt with a statute of limitations that began to run when the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of an alleged breach. The Court held that “actual knowledge” means …. well …. actual knowledge.

ERISA §1113(2) requires plaintiffs with "actual knowledge" of an alleged fiduciary breach to file suit within three years of gaining that knowledge, rather than within the 6-year period that would otherwise apply.

Sulyma sued ERISA plan administrators alleging that they had managed the plans imprudently, and the administrators argued that Sulyma filed suit more than three years after they had disclosed their investment decisions to him. Although Sulyma had visited the website that hosted many of these disclosures many times, he testified that he did not remember reviewing the relevant disclosures and that he had been unaware of the allegedly imprudent investments while working at Intel.

The 9th Circuit held that the administrators were not entitled to summary judgment because Sulyma's testimony created a dispute as to when he gained "actual knowledge" for purposes of §1113(2).

The US Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, and held that a plaintiff does not necessarily have "actual knowledge" under §1113(2) of the information contained in disclosures that he receives but does not read or cannot recall reading. To meet §1113(2)’s "actual knowledge" requirement, the plaintiff must in fact have become aware of that information. This is based on ERISA’s "plain and unambiguous statutory language." To have "actual knowledge" of a piece of information, one must in fact be aware of it.

Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference

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Consistently excellent labor and employment law program. Pacific Coast Labor & Employment Law Conference in Seattle April 30-May 1.

Here’s the brochure: [PDF]

Website: https://pacificlaborlaw.com/2020-conference/2020-registration

email: registration@pacificlaborlaw.com

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Certiorari granted to review exemptions to Affordable Care Act’s birth control mandate.

The US Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania [Briefs] and Trump v. Pennsylvania [Briefs], which deal with the Affordable Care Act’s requirement that employers to provide female employees with health insurance that includes access to certain forms of birth control. In 2013, the government exempted churches and other religious institutions, and provided an “opt-out” process for religious nonprofits. In 2017, the government expanded the exemption to allow private employers with religious or moral objections to opt out.

The rulings now under review (1) affirmed a nationwide injunction of the 2017 rules, (2) held that the government lacked statutory authority under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to expand the exemption, (3) held that adopting the rules violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and (4) held that Little Sisters of the Poor lacked appellate standing.

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